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Abstract: This paper deals with the group decision making 
problem, assuming that each individual defines his/her 
opinion through fuzzy binary preference relations, in 
parallel to the classical approach due to Prof. Arrow. In 
particular, it is postulated that the main reason for the 
discouraging impossibility theorems is neither in the 
domain of admissible preferences or in the concept of 
solution (Social Welfare Functions versus Social Decision 
Functions), but in the underlying idea of rationality under 
all crisp approaches: non complete irrational aggregations 
will be possible under a fuzzy approach, in such a way that 
classical Arrow's theorem should be understood just as an 
impossibility of getting complete rational aggregations. 
Kewords: aggregation rules, fuzzy opinions, fuzzy 
rationality, group decision making. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As shown by Arrow [l] in his classical impossibility 
theorem, aggregation of individual preferences into a 
single social preference represents a difficult task if we 
want to keep a minimum of ethical rules together with a 
minimum of rational rules. 
In his historical work, it was considered an arbitrary 
finite group D of -at least two- human beings, expressing 
their preferences about a finite set X of -at least three- 
feasible alternatives. The problem was stated on how to 
reach to a social preference representing all the group as 
a single individual, and it was assumed that both 
individual and consensus social opinions were expressed by 
linear orders, that is, complete, reflexive and transitive 
binary relations defined on the set X of alternatives. In 
this context it was proved the impossibility of aggregation 
rules assigning a social preference ordering to each 
possible profile of individual preference orderings 
-Social Welfare Functions- verifying some ethical 
conditions which seemed to be desirable at a first sight: 
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(1) Unrestricted domain: each individual is free 
to choose his/her personal preference ordering; 
(2) Non-negative Response: if some changes are 
made by individuals improving their opinions about some 
alternative, it does not cause a final change against such 
alternative; 
(3) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: there 
is no influence between disjoint subsets of alternatives; 
(4) Citizen Sovereign: if people agrees about a 
particular ordering, such ordering should represent the 
social consensus; and 
(5) Non-dictatorship: there is no individual 
imposing systematically his/her opinion. 
Many efforts have been applied to this problem of 
amalgamating individual opinions into a consensus, since it 
represents a key point for the development of any social 
group. Research after Arrow's theorems appears as a long 
discussion in order to know where does the difficulty lie 
in fact. From a normative point of view, the objective was 
to search for minimal sets of conditions allowing some kind 
of social consensus (in some way, it could also help to 
understand how human societies are very often able to solve 
their problems, despite so lots of discouraging 
impossibility theorems that followed Arrow's work). Two 
approaches have been mainly tried: 
(a) By assuming some restriction on the domain, 
arguing that the most important difficulty in practice is 
due to the variety of individual opinions (for example, by 
considering some condition based on Black's 
single-peakedness [2]). As a consequence, it could be said 
that strong contradictions in a group can be solved only by 
suppression of minorities; a more admissible consequence 
was given in a fuzzy context (see [3]) by considering the 
idea of single-peakedness in order to show how dangerous 
for a consensus are those crisp individuals with too clear 
opinions, not inclined anyway to accept other conclusion 
than their own. 
(b) By relaxing the concept of consensus, arguing 
that the real objective in practice is just some useful 
decision-oriented information (for example, by considering 
Sen's Social Decision Functions, which should allow a 
coherent subset of alternatives that should be analyzed in 
a second step). 
Some positive results have been obtained under both 
approaches, but even Sen himself recognizes that Arrow's 
negative philosophy still remains. But though it can be 
understood that there is no general methodology for 
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aggregating crisp individual preferences, in practice 
consensus are usually reached, perhaps through a dynamic 
decision-oriented process, or just making some kind of 
social pressure against discordant individuals to margin 
them in such a way that they are in fact excluded from the 
decision making. Our thesis is that the main difficulty 
under Arrow's focus is not due to how any ethical condition 
is formally written or how the social opinion should be 
expressed, but how the idea of rationality is understood: 
the underlying Aristotelian concept of rationality based 
upon any crisp transitivity or c r i s p  acyclity, which 
provokes to think that if something is not absolutely 
rational, then it is absolutely irrational. In this sense, 
as pointed out in Montero [5], Lukasievicz's censure to 
sciences based on using Aristotelian logic is also valid 
here. 
2.- FUZZY ACYCLITY AS A MEASURE OF RATIONALITY 
Let us assume that each preference is given by a fuzzy 
preference relation, that is, a mapping 
p :  xxx + [0,1] 
where each value p(x,y) represents the intensity of 
preference of alternative x over alternative y (xpy). If 
there is no problem of incomparability, we can assume that 
such a fuzzy preference relation is complete: 
P(X,Y) + Cc(Y,X) 2 1 Vx, y€x 
in such a way that the values 
P,(X,Y) = P(X,Y) + Cl(Y,X) - 1 
Cr,(X,Y) = Cr(X,Y) - P,(X,Y) 
Cl,(X,Y) = P(Y,X) - P,(X,Y) 
can be understood, respectively, as the d-gree of 
indifference between each pair of alternatives (xIy), the 
degree of strict preference of alternative x over 
alternative y (xBy), and the degree of strict preference of 
alternative y over alternative x (xWy). It should be 
pointed out that under our approach, the condition p(x,x)=l 
VXEX is really not required (but depending on such values 
p(x,x) VxeX, the degree of rationality of the relation p 
will be higher or lower, as shown later). 
Our idea in this paper is to keep the complete 
philosophy given in Arrow [l] but allowing strength in 
preference intensities. A natural measure for rationality 
can be proposed, on the basis of the concept of acyclity 
due to Sen [4], allowing a quite different meaning of 
classical Impossibility Theorems. 
Let us consider a given fuzzy preference relation p and 
let us look for a natural weighting of all acyclic chains 
of different alternatives: for example, if we take only the 
alternative x, there is only one acyclic path: 
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XIX 
which can be weighted by pI(x,x); and if we take two 
alternatives {x,y), we can find three different acyclic 
paths: 
xByWx, yBxWy, xIyIx 
which can be weighted respectively by 
In general, a path xl-xz-. . . -xk-x1 of k distinct 
alternatives will be non-acyclic if and only if 
XlPX2P. . . PXkPXl with some strict preference or 
xlPxkP.. .Px2Pxl with some strict preference; in our 
context, a natural degree of acyclity of a given path can 
be defined by an addition -through all contained acyclic 
chains- of products of preference intensities (see [5]). 
Based on those path weights, rationality -that is, 
acyclity- can be defined as a fuzzy property 
being R(X) is the family of all complete fuzzy preference 
relations on X; the value A ( p )  will be the minimum sum of 
weights of acyclic paths over all possible chains of 
alternatives: 
A ( p )  = min A (G) 
where G=(x -x -...- xk) represents an arbitrary path of 
different alternatives and, taking by convenience, 
A: R(X) + [0,1] 
I.1 
1 2  
For example, if X=(x,y,z) with 
cr(x,x) = cl(y,y) = c c ( z , z )  = 1 
Cr(X,y) = 0.3, LL(y,X) = 0.8 
Cr(Y,z) = 0-9, P(z,y) = 0 . 4  
p(z,x) = 0.5, p(x,z) = 0.7 
then the degree of acyclity -rationality- of such a 
complete fuzzy preference relation p will be 
A ( p )  = min { 1, 1, 1; 0.54, 0.46, 0.38; 0.653) = 0.38 
where we can find -in this order- the sum of acyclic 
weights for the three chains (x), (y) and ( z )  with only one 
alternative (in this case we find what we know as crisp 
reflexivity), the sum of acyclic weights for the three 
chains (x,y), (y,z) and (z,x) with two alternatives, and 
the acyclity for the unique chain (x,y,z) with three 
alternatives. In particular, the path G=(z,x) drops the 
lowest acyclity A (G), that is, the highest irrationality. cr 
Obviously, the number of numerical operations required 
for the above expression increases exponentially as the 
number of alternatives grows up. Moreover, in real 
applications, we can find that some portion of 
irrationality can be justified just by considering the size 
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of the problem (the higher number of comparisons needed, 
the lowest acyclity); this structural acyclity should by 
measured by some ad hoc sensitivity analysis. For example, 
very long chains fall very easily to the level 0.5 of 
acyclity (see [ 5 ] ) ,  suggesting a modification of the above 
initial definition for A(p), perhaps by weighting all the 
values A ( G ) ,  depending on the size of the path G .  
c1 
3.- THE AMALGAMATING PROBLEM UNDER FUZZY RATIONALITY 
Following the welfare-oriented approach of Arrow, and 
assuming preference intensities between all pairs of 
alternatives, in such a way that individuals and group 
opinions are represented by complete fuzzy preference 
relations, Social Welfare Functions in this context can be 
defined -as a first proposal- as mappings 
(card(D)=n), verifying analogous ethical conditions to 
those of Arrow: 
s: R"(X) + R(X) 
(1) Unrestricted Domain: such mapping is in fact 
defined over all popible profiles of complete fuzzy 
preference relations R (X). 
( 2 )  Non-Negative Response: 
S(p1,p2, fP") (x,Y)=S(q1,q2r IS") (X,Y) vxfYE'x 
whenever pi (x, y) zqi (x, y) ViED, vx, yeX 
( 3 )  Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: 
p'(x,y)=q'(x,y) VieD, Vx,yeYcX + 
* S(P',P2, IP") (x,Y)Wq1,q2r . ,s") (XlY) ~X,Y~YCX 
for any non-empty subset of alternatives Y. 
( 4 )  Citizen Sovereign: for any given peR(X) there 
exists a profile (p' , p2, . . . , p") eRn (X) such that 
S(P',P2, IP") (x,Y)=P(xfY) vx, y€x 
(5) Non-Dictatorship: there is no individual iED 
such that 
for all x,y~X and any (p ,p , . . . ,pi-' ,pi*l, .. . ,p") 
S(P',P2, IP") (X,Y)=P'(x,Y) 
1 2  (X) . 
The condition of Unrestricted Domain requires a more 
carefully discussion in order to maintain Arrow's 
philosophy: when linear orders were associated to each 
individual and the group itself, it was assumed -from our 
point of view- that individuals and group were absolutely 
rational; and this should be the strict consequence of 
classical Impossibility Theorems: there is no ethical 
possibility of assuring absolute rationality. From our 
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point of view, such maximum degree of rationality can not 
be claimed in practical situations, neither for 
individuals; hence, perhaps some minimums degrees of 
rationality should be previously defined for the group 
preference relation and all individual preference 
relations. A simple approach could be just assume that 
individuals are not absolutely irrational, and then ask if 
it is possible to find rules assuring non absolutely 
irrationality for the group. 
According to these last comments, let us denote 
%(XI = { I I E R ( X )  / A(II)>O) 
the set of Non-Absolutely Irrational (NAI) complete fuzzy 
preference relations. A NAI Social Welfare Function will be 
then given by a mapping 
satisfying the above conditions (1) to (5), where R n ( X )  and 
R ( X )  have been replaced, respectively, by @(X) and F(X). 
Then we can escape from the crisp negative result, since it 
will be possible to find NAI Social Welfare Functions 
verifying such ethical rules.Though weak at first sight -it 
merely implies the absence of absolute irrationality, no 
matter how close the opinions are to absolute rationality- 
this positive result represents a justification for a 
posterior research looking for the best or a satisfying NAI 
aggregation rule, perhaps by adding to the model an 
additional criterion, as some consensus measure (see [ 6 ] ) .  
s: Y n ( X )  + 3(X) 
4 . -  TWO EXAMPLES AND A FINAL COMMENT 
Two well known NAI Social Welfare Functions which 
appear very often in the literature, as democratic 
aggregation rules assuring that A(o)>O alwayslholds for the 
social fuzzy preference (r -assuming that A(p )>O VicD also 
hold- are the following: 
* Arithmetical Weighted Mean (see [7] for an 
alternative axiomatic justification): 
vx , y€x 
* Maximum (it is a conservative rule that can be 
in some cases poorly decisive, in a clear parallelism with 
classical Social Decision Functions): 
a(x,Y)=,!???r, Pl (XlY) vx , y€x 
An axiomatic study of general social fuzzy preferences 
based on means can be found in Ovchinnikov [ 8 ] ,  also 
presenting them as a way of avoiding Arrow's paradox, but 
assuming that individual preferences are of c r i s p  nature. 
In any case, both results are showing how useful can be 
Fuzzy Set Theory in order to get a better knowledge of this 
particular complex decision making problem. 
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